This inversion of values develops out of the ressentiment of the powerful by the weak. Has it, in fact, a right to live? We should not fail to hear the almost benevolent nuances which for a Greek noble, for example, lay in all the words with which he set himself above the lower people—how a constant type of pity, consideration, and forbearance is mixed in there, sweetening the words, to the point where almost all words which refer to the common man finally remain as expressions for "unhappy," "worthy of pity" compare deilos [cowardly], deilaios [lowly, mean], poneros [oppressed by toil, wretched], mochtheros [suffering, wretched]—the last two basically designating the common man as a slave worker and beast of burden.
Bonus accordingly as the man of discord, of variance, "entzweiung" duoas the warrior: one sees what in ancient Rome "the good" meant for a man. For what is the blessedness of that Paradise?
We come back again and again into the light, we live over and over our golden hour of victory—and then we stand there, just as we were born, unbreakable, tense, ready for something new, for something even more difficult, more distant, like a bow which all trouble only serves to pull more tight.
Punishment, then, is a transaction in which the injury to the autonomous individual is compensated for by the pain inflicted on the culprit. And this No is its creative act. Should not one wish that consummation with all one's strength?
Tunc magis tragoedi audiendi, magis scilicet vocales" with louder tones and more violent shrieks "in sua propria calamitate; tunc histriones cognoscendi, solutiores multo per ignem; tunc spectandus auriga in flammea rota totus rubens, tunc xystici contemplandi non in gymnasiis, sed in igne jaculati, nisi quod ne tunc quidem illos velim vivos, ut qui malim ad eos potius conspectum insatiabilem conferre, qui in dominum saevierunt.
The process by which the succession of different meanings is imposed is driven by the " will to power "—the basic instinct for domination underlying all human action.
There is a very interesting epistemological digression at iii.
It is only in the guise of the ascetic priest that the philosopher is first able to make his appearance without attracting suspicion of his overweening will to power.